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ABSTRACT
Outcome bias occurs when an evaluator considers ex-post outcomes when judging whether a choiceZDV
correct, ex-ante.  We formalize this cognitive bias in a simple model of distorted Bayesian updating.
We then examine strategy changes made by professional football coaches.  We find they are more
likely to revise their strategy after a loss than a win — even for narrow losses, which are uninformative
about future success.  This increased revision following a loss occurs even when a loss was expected,
and the offensive strategy is revised even when failure is attributable to the defense.  These results
are consistent with our model’s predictions.
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1.  Introduction 
  In a broad variety of settings, economic actors must regularly evaluate whether their 
current strategy is still optimal in a constantly shifting environment.  Firms adjust product and 
pricing decisions as technology and consumer preferences change.  University faculty update 
their research strategy in response to changes in professional norms and realized successes.  
Parents revise rules and incentives as their child’s needs and circumstances change. 
  These revisions of strategy crucially rely on the actor’s ability to process information 
about which parts of their strategy are working well and which need adjustment; yet in practice, 
these evaluations are not necessarily objective and dispassionate.  When asking individuals to 
assess the appropriateness of an action, psychologists have documented an outcome bias in their 
evaluation:  even when ex-ante information is identical, the action is considered more justified if 
the ex-post outcome was favorable.  Baron and Hershey (1988) show that individuals were more 
likely to be critical of a medical decision when the outcome was poor, even though the objective 
risk of a poor outcome was the same.  Thus, an outcome-biased actor is likely to revise strategies 
sub-optimally — failing to make needed adjustments after fortuitous successes and changing 
excessively after unlucky failures. 
  Prior empirical research has documented an outcome bias in various experimental 
laboratory settings.  We examine outcome bias in a high stakes environment in which this bias 
can have a dramatic effect on an individual’s career and earnings.  We also provide a simple 
theoretical model of outcome bias, which produces behavior consistent with our empirical 
findings.  In our model actors primarily follow standard Bayesian updating, but place 
inordinately more weight on success/failure than other available information about future success.   2 
  Empirical examinations of how economic actors adjust strategies are complicated by the 
fact that it can be difficult to describe a strategy in a parsimonious fashion.  Additionally, this 
requires panel data on the strategy and its consequences for multiple periods.  We overcome 
these challenges by examining how NFL coaches adjust their play calling in response to past 
success or failure.  This is a high stakes setting in which coaches have a strong career incentive 
to implement a strategy each week that maximizes the probability of victory.
1  Additionally, we 
have detailed data from 5,661 games over 25 seasons. 
  The strategic decision we focus on is the offensive strategy of how frequently to pass 
versus run the ball.  We show that teams’ passing frequency is correlated from week to week.  
Furthermore, the team’s offensive strategy is more than twice as persistent when the team wins 
relative to when the team loses.  This simple finding can be readily explained by the fact that 
when the team wins, the coach receives a positive signal regarding the efficacy of his strategy.  
However, a closer examination of the empirical findings suggests the existence of outcome bias. 
  First, the persistence in pass frequency remains higher after narrow victories versus 
narrow losses, even though either outcome has the same information content regarding future 
success.  Second, strong teams show greater persistence in their offensive strategy and exhibit 
less evidence of outcome bias.  Third, coaches’ decision to change strategies is equally 
responsive to expected and unexpected success.  If coaches were optimally incorporating 
information they should respond only to unexpected performance.  Fourth, coaches adjust their 
offensive strategy in response to the success or failure of their defense. 
To provide a clearer definition of outcome bias, we develop a simple model of an 
individual evaluating whether to switch between two strategies.  After choosing one, he observes 
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1 Lefgren and Platt (2011) show that the probability an NFL coach is fired is strongly related to team performance in 
the current season, as measured by the number of games won.   3 
a noisy measure (on the real line) of the quality of his choice.  His goal is to maximize the 
probability of success, which occurs if the measure lies above zero.
2  The individual observes the 
success/failure (the outcome) as well as the continuous measure which generates it (overall 
performance); he then uses Bayes’ rule to estimate the expected future success of both options, 
switching if the other strategy is more likely to succeed. 
We incorporate outcome bias by assuming that the individual inflates the ex-ante 
likelihood of the outcome that actually occurred; that is, they act as if success was more likely 
than it really was following a successful outcome.  This creates a discontinuous jump in the 
probability of switching strategies when comparing performance just below or just above zero, 
while decisions to switch will appear Bayesian for performance further from the threshold.  This 
outcome bias can also induce an individual to switch strategies after failure due to events outside 
his control. 
  Our results suggest that NFL coaches exhibit outcome bias in that they attribute excess 
importance to the role of their strategy in determining whether they won or lost a game.  
Consequently, they may switch strategies excessively after losses and not enough after wins.  
Our findings suggest that outcome bias may make it difficult for economic agents to make 
optimal strategic choices in a variety of settings, most noticeably for decisions where the strategy 
barely worked (or barely failed). 
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2  This will be natural in our empirical setting.  The quality of a team’s performance may be best measured by the 
difference between their score and the opponents, but the most salient measure of success is whether the team won 
or lost. Even so, this setup is relevant for a much broader variety of settings.  For example, students are categorized 
as having failed a course based on their inability to cross a threshold level of performance.  Managers may be 
considered unsuccessful if they do not hit predetermined targets for sales or profits.  Doctors may be particularly 
concerned about whether a sick patient dies, despite other measures such as prolonging life or reducing pain.   4 
2. Prior Literature 
Evaluating decisions made under uncertainty is not an easy task; psychologists have 
documented a number of cognitive biases that can distort the evaluation.
3  For our current setting, 
the two most relevant are outcome bias and hindsight bias.  
When judging the correctness of a decision, one typically evaluates it from the ex-ante 
position of the decision maker, asking whether it was the best choice given the information 
available at the time.  Outcome bias occurs when the evaluator considers the ex-post outcome as 
well.
4  This bias was first labeled by Baron and Hershey (1988).  In their study, students were 
given objective data on the risks of a medical procedure, and were asked to rate the correctness 
of a decision.  The students consistently felt the decision was more justified when the outcome 
was successful than when it failed, even though all other information was unchanged.  Positive 
outcomes also produced a more favorable view of gambling decisions. 
Similar outcome bias has been shown in a variety of laboratory settings, rating ethically-
questionable choices (Gino, Moore, and Bazerman, 2008), decisions that benefit one while 
causing greater harm to another (Gino, Shu, and Bazerman, 2010), decisions by a fictitious 
salesperson’s to pursue one client over another (Marshall and Mowen, 1993), and hypothetical 
military decisions (Lipshitz 1989). 
Ratner and Herbst (2005) take this a step further to consider how outcome bias affects 
future decisions.  Students were given two investment options, one of which had a clearly higher 
expected return and was thus the initial choice of most students.  After learning the realized 
returns, students showed outcome bias, rating their own decision more favorably when the 
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3 Earl (1990) and Rabin (1998) survey a much larger set of cognitive limitations, describing their potential 
importance in economic settings. 
4 If the outcome could reveal additional information held by the decision maker, the evaluator is not considered 
biased for considering it.  For instance, if a home buyer discovers a massive mold problem shortly after closing, he 
may reasonably suspect the seller had more information than she disclosed.   5 
outcome was positive.  When revisiting the two options for a second round, 23% of those with 
bad outcomes switched to the lower average return option, while only 2% of those with good 
outcomes switched.  Significantly, this demonstrates that outcome bias can occur in evaluating 
one’s own decisions, and can distort one’s future decisions. 
A much larger literature considers hindsight bias (Fischhoff 1975), which occurs when 
people with knowledge of an outcome falsely believe they would have predicted that outcome.  
Of course, hindsight bias could easily lead to outcome bias: if the evaluator believes the outcome 
was inevitable, he will condemn the decision maker for not acting accordingly.  Thus, some 
studies on hindsight bias overlap with the results on outcome bias.  For example LaBine and 
LaBine (1996) asked participants to act as jurors in a hypothetical malpractice suit for a therapist 
of a potentially violent patient.  They assessed what the therapist should have known (hindsight 
bias was found) and should have done (outcome bias was found).  
Hindsight bias has been studied extensively in the laboratory as well as in political 
polling; early studies are surveyed in Hawkins and Hastie (1990).  The documented fact is that, 
after learning the outcome, people tend to shift their assessment of the expected outcome towards 
the true outcome.  For instance, pollsters have asked voters on the day of an election what they 
expect the percentage outcomes to be; the next day, they ask voters to express what they thought 
the outcome would be.  These recalled expectations are consistently closer to the actual result 
(Hawkins and Hastie, 1990, p. 317). 
Outcome and hindsight bias have received some limited attention from economists.  
Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) study whether more-informed participants in a market 
game can reproduce the judgments of participants with a given subset of information.  Consistent 
with hindsight bias, the informed are swayed by their added knowledge of the outcome and tend   6 
to make worse decisions as a consequence.  Outcome bias could also contribute to the hot-hand 
effect in sports, in which bettors overestimate the autocorrelation in performance; Offerman and 
Sonnemans (2004) introduce two distortions to standard Bayesian updating and determine that 
the hot-hand distortion can effectively explain their data, while the other distortion (recency) has 
no significant impact.  Dobbs (1991), a purely theoretical study, also has some relevance.  He 
considers Bayesian updating in the face of ambiguity.  That is, agents are unsure of which 
probability distribution governs a random event, and update their beliefs of the likely distribution 
after observing the outcome. After such updating, agents would appear to have hindsight bias: 
their best estimate of the ex-ante probability of the event that occurred will always be higher than 
the same estimate before learning the outcome. 
The current study offers several advantages over the preceding literature on outcome and 
hindsight bias.  First, we study real-life decisions by experts in a high-stakes setting; our results 
confirm that outcome bias occurs outside the laboratory.  Second, in our setting, coaches are 
evaluating their own decisions, rather than the decisions of others (as is common in most of the 
preceding literature).
5  It is easier to be critical or dismissive of the choices of others, and hence 
more significant to find outcome bias in self-evaluation.  Third, we examine how these biases 
distort future decisions, which ultimately determines whether these biases actually matter.  This 
issue is directly addressed only in Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989) and Ratner and 
Herbst (2005).  Fourth, we construct a model of decision making in which otherwise Bayesian 
agents exhibit outcome bias.  In doing so, we translate a specific cognitive limitation into a set of 
theoretical predictions that are highly consistent with our empirical analysis. 
Our project adds to a body of prior work in which sports competitions have provided a 
fertile setting for testing economic theories.  For example, Pope and Schweitzer (2011) test for 
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5 Jones, Yurak, and Frisch (1997), Ratner and Herbst (2005), Gray, Beilock, and Carr (2007) are notable exceptions.   7 
players’ loss aversion in golf tournaments, and Card and Dahl (2011) test for loss aversion 
among NFL fans.  Romer (2006) shows that football coaches fail to optimize when deciding 
whether to “go for it” on fourth down.  Chiappori, Groseclose, and Levitt (2002) test whether 
soccer players behave as predicted by a simple “matching pennies” game when making penalty 
kicks.  Gray and Gray (1997) test the efficiency of betting markets in the NFL.  Our work is 
similar in spirit to these earlier papers.  
Our paper also relates to a growing literature that examines whether economic agents are 
held accountable for factors outside of their control.  For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2001) show that CEOs are rewarded on the basis of share price movements that are due to 
factors outside of the manager’s control.  Wolfers (2002) presents evidence that voters are less 
likely to vote for incumbent politicians during poor economic circumstances, even when the 
difficulties cannot be attributed to the politician.  Lefgren and Platt (2011) show that football 
franchises fire and retain coaches on the basis of team performance outside of the coach’s 
control.  Collectively, these and other papers show that individuals have difficulty assessing 
other people’s contribution to a successful or unsuccessful outcome.  Our paper builds on this 
literature by demonstrating how people hold themselves accountable for success or failure 
unrelated to the quality of their own decision. 
 
3.  A Model of Outcome Bias 
  We now present a simple model in which an agent evaluates the effectiveness of a 
particular strategy via Bayesian updating.  We then expand the model to allow for an outcome 
bias. 
   8 
Bayesian Updating 
Consider an environment in which a single decision maker (a coach) must select either 
game plan   or  .
6  In state  , the performance   of plan   is normally distributed with mean 
 and variance  , while plan   produces the same variance but mean  .  In state  , the 
means of the performance are reversed.
7   
Let   denote the prior belief that   is the current state, and   denote 
the probability that the state changes between periods.  After an observed performance  , the 
coach uses Bayesian updating to determine the posterior probability that   is the current state.  
For instance, if the coach used plan   and observed performance  , the likelihood of this 
performance in state   and  , respectively, are: 
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e
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Thus, the estimated posterior of the Bayesian coach would be: 
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We interpret the performance of a team’s game plan as the difference between the final 
scores of that team and its opponent.  Thus, if P > 0, the outcome is that team wins the game.  If 
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6 While we only consider two alternatives, this can be easily generalized.  For each alternative, there should be at 
least one state of the world in which it provides the best average payoff.  Bayesian updating would occur across all 
states, with the team selecting the plan with the highest expected payoff. 
7 Here, the game plan does not specify each play, which needs to be randomized to avoid exploitation by the 
opponent.  Rather, it should be seen as the broad strategy (such as how frequently to call passing plays).  The 
effectiveness of the game plan is mostly a question of how well it draws on the particular strengths of the team — a 
good fit will lead to a higher average performance.  Strategic decisions (such as choosing a specific play that the 
opponent does not anticipate) would be reflected in the variance of performance. 
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A B  9 
the coach’s objective is to win as frequently as possible, he should employ plan   as long as 
, and switch to plan   otherwise. 
By solving for the   where   for a given  , one obtains a performance threshold 
 
ˆ P ! ( )=
h+!
2
+
"
2
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% &
'
( ) .  If performance falls below this threshold, the coach will switch 
plans before the next game.  It is noteworthy that generally  ; that is, changing plans 
will not typically hinge on whether the team wins or loses.  For example, if a coach has a strong 
prior that he is using the right strategy (  is close to 1), the last term will be strongly negative.  
He could suffer a large loss and still remain convinced that he has the right strategy (though   
will fall after each poor performance, eventually leading to a change).  Indeed,  ˆ P ! ( )= 0  only 
when 
 
! =1 1+e
h
2"!
2 ( ) 2#
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Outcome Bias 
To incorporate an outcome bias, we assume that the coach over-weights the likelihood of 
the outcome that actually occurred by a factor  .  That is, having used plan a, the coach 
interprets a winning (losing) outcome as additional evidence that A  (B) was the current state, 
even though performance P  fully accounts for that information.  This distorts the ex-ante 
likelihood used in Bayesian updating to make the observed win (loss) more likely than it really 
was.  Formally, a biased coach using plan   and observing outcome   obtains a posterior: 
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But using plan   and observing outcome  , the coach reaches a posterior:
8 
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  Performance   almost never occurs, and hence can be resolved either way without 
loss of generality.  Note, however, that as   increases,   is jumps upward discontinuously at 
.  This affects performance threshold  
! P ! ( ), below which the coach switches plans:   
. 
With outcome bias,  
! P ! ( ) equals 0 for an interval of priors, which we call S: 
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Within this subset of priors, the coach will reach a posterior   for any  , and reach a 
posterior   for any P < 0 .  Thus, if ! "S  then the coach switches strategies if and only if 
he loses the game.  As   increases, the posterior increases for   and decreases it for P < 0 , 
making the size of the discontinuity (and the interval S) larger. 
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8 The hot-hand distortion in Offerman and Sonnemans (2004) has some similarity to our model, in that agents 
overweight the ex-ante probability that the coin is unfair when using Bayes’ rule.  The key difference is that our 
teams overweight the ex-ante probability of whichever outcome (win/loss) actually occurred, rather than always 
overweighting the same event. 
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Consequences 
  We now present several predictions of this model that shed light on our empirical work. 
 
1.  Under either Bayesian or biased updating, a coach is more likely to change strategy after 
worse performance.  Yet under biased updating, a coach is more likely to change strategy 
even when comparing a narrow loss to a narrow victory. 
 
  The first claim simply comes from ! ˆ " !P > 0 and  ! ! " !P > 0.  A worse performance 
result in a lower posterior, and thus a coach is more likely to switch strategies.  The second claim 
comes from the discontinuity at P = 0.  Any coaches who entered the game with ! "S  will 
switch strategies if and only if  .  Since the interval S  likely contains many coaches if !  is 
moderately large, we would see that bias leads coaches (on average) to switch more often after 
losing than after winning, even when the margin of victory (or loss) was small.  This would not 
show up for Bayesian coaches because a narrow loss only has a little more negative information 
(about future performance) than a narrow win, and would thus only cause the tiny fraction of 
coaches with priors near 
 
! =1 1+e
h
2"!
2 ( ) 2#
2 ( ) to change strategy. 
  It is worth noting that biased coaches are mistaken on both sides of P = 0.  They are too 
complacent after a narrow victory, over-estimating  ! ! , and too worrisome after a narrow loss, 
under-estimating  ! ! .  These mistakes lessen as the magnitude of performance increases (such as 
decisive victories or defeats). 
 
2.  Under either Bayesian or biased updating, a team with stronger past performance is less 
likely to change strategy after worse performance.  Under biased updating, a team with 
P < 0  12 
stronger past performance will appear to be less biased than one with weak past 
performance. 
 
Past performance is encapsulated in the prior belief ! , which is higher after repeated 
success.  This has two effects on updating.  First, ! ˆ " !" > 0 and  ! ! " !" > 0; which is to say 
that with a stronger prior and the same realized performance, the posterior will also be stronger.  
Because of the accumulated positive evidence, the coach’s confidence in its current strategy is 
less shaken by a given event.  Thus, the posterior is less likely to fall below 1 2  and lead to a 
change of game plan. 
A strong prior will also make outcome bias less visible, though.  For instance, if 
 
! > " " +e
h
2#!
2 ( ) 2$
2 ( ), then  
! P ! ( )< 0; that is, barely losing is not enough to warrant a change 
in game plan.  Indeed, the higher !  is, the worse performance that will be tolerated without 
switching game plans.  Yet even then, !  still distorts the calculation of  ! ! , as the posterior still 
drops discontinuously as performance falls below P = 0 .  Our point is merely that it will not fall 
below 1 2 for those with high ! . Empirically, coaches with a strong record will appear to use 
standard Bayesian updating, in contrast to those with a weak record, even if they use the same 
biased updating process. 
 
3.  Under Bayesian updating, only unexpected performance will affect the likelihood of 
changing game plans; higher expected performance has no effect.  Under biased updating, 
unexpected performance also matters, but even expected losses can also lead to game 
plan changes.   13 
Higher expected performance could enter our model in a number of ways, but the 
simplest is to assume that both h and  ! increase by equal amounts.  That is, average team 
performance increases whether the team is using the right game plan or the wrong one, with the 
difference between them remaining the same. 
When a Bayesian coach has higher expectations, he will hold his team to a higher 
standard: for a given performance P , the posterior  ˆ !  is lower as h and  ! both increase.  Since 
the team with higher expectations should have been able to accomplish more, an unchanged 
performance gives the coach less confidence that he has the right game plan.  In fact, it is only 
the difference between expected and realized performance that matters in the Bayesian updating.  
If  h ,  !, and P  each increase by ! , there is literally no change in  ˆ ! .  Thus, when expected and 
unexpected performance are included in the same regression, the former should have no impact 
on the likelihood of changing strategy, while the latter will be negatively correlated with strategy 
changes.
9 
For a biased coach, higher expected performance operates identically on  ! ! .  However, 
this does not mean they only react to unexpected performance, as Bayesian coaches do.  This is 
because  ! ! " !# > 0 if and only if P > 0 ; bias increases the posterior for wins and lowers it for 
loses, regardless of expectations in h and  !.  Indeed, in the extreme case (as !  becomes very 
large), the only factor that coaches consider in retaining their game plan is whether they won or 
lost, regardless of whether the outcome was expected or not.  Thus, even with moderate bias, 
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9 Alternative interpretations of increased expectations (e.g. h increases by more than  ! ) could potentially introduce 
some correlation between higher expectation and strategy changes.  As the gap widens between the right and the 
wrong plan, the same amount of sub-par performance (i.e. unexpected performance) is interpreted more harshly.  
Even then, this indirect effect of expected performance should be second-order compared to the direct effect of 
unexpected performance.   14 
coaches will be more likely to adjust their game plan when performance is lower, even (to some 
extent) when that performance was expected. 
 
4.  Under Bayesian updating, a coach should not switch game plans due to events that 
influence the outcome but are unrelated to the plan.  Under biased updating, unrelated 
event may induce switching, particularly in close outcomes. 
 
Many random events contribute the final outcome of the game.  In particular, a coach’s 
offensive strategy may be effective; yet they will still lose the game if their defense cannot stop 
opposing drives.  A Bayesian coach would not allow defensive performance to taint the 
evaluation of offensive strategy.  Rather, the observed performance P  would be adjusted for 
events that are irrelevant to the offensive strategy before performing Bayesian updating.  Thus, 
while the coach still responds to the adjusted performance measure as before, they will 
completely ignore irrelevant factors. 
A coach with outcome bias can perform the same adjustment, but we assume that the 
coach is still biased by the actual outcome rather than the adjusted outcome.  For example, if the 
team only lost due to defensive errors, they evaluate their offensive strategy with a performance 
P > 0 , but still place extra weight on the ex-ante likelihood of state B.  The resulting posterior 
 ! !  will be lower than what a Bayesian coach would conclude, and hence the coach could switch 
strategies even when the offense-specific evidence is favorable.  Of course, this bias will be most 
noticeable in close games, since factors that are irrelevant to the offensive performance are likely 
to still be relevant to the actual outcome.     
   15 
4. Data 
Before we move forward to our empirical analyses, it is crucial to identify our empirical 
measure of a coach’s strategy.  Football is a complicated sport.  Indeed, the official rule book for 
the NFL is 289 pages.  Coaches choose between many offensive and defensive plays.  
Additionally, a single play can include contingencies, in which a player’s actions depend on the 
behavior of players on the other team.  In order to make empirical headway it is necessary to 
characterize a unidimensional index of strategy that is both measurable and relevant.   
The measure we construct is the fraction of offensive plays (not including punts and field 
goal attempts) in which the team attempts to pass the ball, which we refer to as fraction pass.  
Passing is generally considered a high risk / high reward offensive approach.  On average, when 
a team passes the ball they advance the ball further down the field than would be the case if they 
ran the ball (about 2.6 yards more). However, there is a higher probability of a negative event 
including an interception (where the team loses possession of the ball), a loss of yards if the 
quarterback is tackled prior to the pass, or an incomplete pass in which the ball is not advanced.  
Due to differences in personnel and coaching philosophy, teams differ systematically in their 
propensity to pass the ball.  Additionally, coaches may adjust their game plan, including the 
planned mix of runs and passes, from week to week to adjust to their opponent or improve their 
offensive efficiency. 
We use data on NFL team performance from the 1985 to 2009 seasons, provided by 
NFLData.com.  Our complete sample of data includes 11,322 team-game observations, each of 
which indicates the fraction passing plays for the team in the game and the final score.  The 
average team runs a passing play about 53.7% of the time though this passing rate varies from 
38.5% at the 10
th percentile to 68.6% at the 90
th percentile and overall has a standard deviation of 
11.6 percentage points.    16 
From the final score, we compute the score differential between the team and its 
opponent (which also indicates by its sign whether the team won or lost).  In football, each 
touchdown is worth six points (with the opportunity to achieve an extra point, which happens 
most of the time). The average team scores 20.7 points per game with a standard deviation of 
10.3 points.  The absolute value of the score differential has a mean of 11.6 points with a 
standard deviation of 9.2. 
To measure expected performance, we use the gambling spread for the game.  The 
gambling spread is empirically an unbiased measure of the expected score differential, and is 
constructed by gambling establishments to balance the number of people betting for or against a 
particular team.  We define unexpected performance as the difference between the actual score 
differential and the gambling spread.  The standard deviation of the measure of expected 
performance (the gambling spread) is 6.6 points, while unexpected performance has a standard 
deviation of 13.3 points, indicating that the majority of variation in team performance is 
unexpected.  We also measure past team performance using the fraction of current-season games 
won by a team prior to the current game, though, in the cases where we use this measure in our 
analysis, we restrict our sample to games that occur during the second half of the season.  
 
5. Empirical Evidence 
Sticking with What Barely Worked 
Our theoretical framework suggests that when coaches suffer from biased updating, their 
strategic decisions will be overly sensitive to the outcome of their last game.  One manifestation 
of this is that even though team strategy affects a continuous performance measure (the score 
differential), coaches will ascribe additional importance to whether this performance results in a   17 
positive outcome (victory).  Hence, coaches will be more likely to adjust their strategies after a 
narrow loss than after a narrow victory.   
In Figure 1a, we show the probability of winning the next week’s game as a function of 
the score differential in the current week.  The y-axis represents the difference in probability of 
winning next week’s game between the winner and loser of the current game.  The x-axis 
represents the closeness of the game.  For example, restricted to games determined by ten or 
fewer points, the winner has about a three percentage point higher probability of winning the 
next game than the loser.  This difference is statistically significant, as shown by the dashed lines 
indicating the 95 percent confidence interval (based on standard errors cluster-corrected at the 
team-year level).  For games decided by six or fewer points, the difference in probability of 
winning the next game between winners and losers of the current game is only 1.8 percentage 
points and is statistically insignificant (p-value of 0.297).  This is difference is estimated using 
3,368 observations.
10  This figure suggests that for games decided by less than a touchdown, 
winning (or losing) the game conveys little information regarding the team’s future success. 
We now examine whether even for these close games, winning teams persist with their 
strategy at a higher rate than losing teams.  To test this, we estimate the following regression: 
1 , , 3 , 2 , , 1 0 1 , _ * _ _ + + + + + + = t i t i t i t i t i t i win pass frac win pass frac pass frac ε β β β β , 
where  t i pass frac , _  represents team i’s fraction of passing plays in game t, and  t i win ,  is a binary 
variable measuring whether team i won game t.  In this specification,  2 β  measures the 
persistence of team i’s strategy from week t-1 to week t if the team lost, as in an AR1 process.  
This coefficient will be greater than zero as long as there is some persistence.   1 β  shows how the 
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10 Curiously, winners of games decided by one or two points are significantly more likely to win their next game.  
This small anomaly does not match up with the pattern for the rest of the figure, and loses significance after 
accounting for team strength (discussed in this subsection and illustrated in Figure 2a).   18 
persistence of the team’s strategy increases after a win.  Our model predicts that even for close 
games, where winning provides little information,  1 β  will be positive if coaches exhibit outcome 
bias. 
  Figure 1b maps out  1 β  for a set of games decided by no more than a particular number of 
points.  We see that  1 β  is consistently positive and relatively stable; the slight upward slope is 
consistent with either Bayesian or biased updating, since larger victories are taken as stronger 
signals that the right strategy is in use.   However, under Bayesian updating, this coefficient 
should be statistically insignificant once winning is uninformative; but this does not hold.  The 
only exception is as the sample size gets small and standard errors get large for games decided 
only by one or two points.  Examining Figures 1a and Figures 1b together, we see that even for 
close games in which winning has no significant relationship with the next game’s outcome, the 
impact of winning on the persistence of offensive strategy is still large and significant. 
  Table 2 helps use better describe the magnitude of the effect.  Column 1 reports the effect 
for the entire sample while column 2 provides estimates for just those games decided by six or 
fewer points.  Focusing on these close games, we see that the losing team’s persistence is 0.145, 
which means a losing team that passes ten percentage points more than average in week t !1 
will pass 1.45 percentage points more often in week t  on average.  A winning team’s offensive 
strategy persists at a rate 0.107 higher than losing teams (a 74 percent increase in persistence).  
Consequently, a winning team that passes ten percentage points more than average in week t !1, 
on average, passes 2.5 percentage points more often during the following week. 
  It may be the case that even for games decided by six or fewer points, winning still 
contains sufficient information to rationalize the observed increase in persistence.  To address 
this concern, we examine games in the second half of the season in which the coaches already   19 
have a large amount of information regarding their team’s strengths and weaknesses.  For such 
coaches, winning instead of losing one additional game by a small margin should have even less 
information.  To see that this is the case, we estimate a linear probability model in which the 
dependent variable is whether the team won its game the next week.  The independent variables 
include whether the team won in the current week as well as the fraction of games won in the 
weeks leading up to the current week.  Figure 2a shows the coefficient on the variable indicating 
a current week win.  Consistent with our conjecture, winning a marginal game has very little 
information about future success (even less than in Figure 1a).  For example, winning a game by 
six or fewer points has a slight negative, though insignificant, relationship with the probability of 
winning the next game. 
  While winning a close game in these circumstances provides essentially no information 
to coaches, they still update their strategy based on whether they win.  To show this we estimate 
the following regression model: 
frac_ passi,t+1 = !0 +!1frac_ passi,t *wini,t +!2 frac_ passi,t +!3wini,t
+!4 frac_ passi,t *win_ fractioni,t +!5win_ fractioni,t +"i,t+1
. 
For ease of interpretation,  t i pass frac , _  and  t i fraction win , _  are centered about their means.  
Figure 2b shows the value of  1 β  estimated on different samples.  Because of the centering, this 
represents the mean increase in persistence associated with winning the current game.  We 
observe a large increase in persistence that is very stable regardless of our choice of samples, 
again indicating that when teams win, they stick with what barely worked even if the success 
contains no information.  The third and fourth columns of Table 2 quantify the magnitude of the 
impact.  Focusing on column 4 we see that winning increases persistence by 0.163 off of a 
baseline of 0.143 (a 112% increase).   20 
Seemingly Rational Winners 
  The second prediction of our model is that stronger teams exhibit more persistence in 
their strategic choice and switch less based on the outcome of a particular game.  To test this 
hypothesis, we focus on teams in the last half of the season, for which we have a good measure 
of team strength (namely, their record from the first half).  We run the following regression: 
frac_ passi,t+1 = !0 +!1frac_ passi,t *wini,t *win_ fractioni,t +!2 frac_ passi,t *win_ fractioni,t
+!3frac_ passi,t *wini,t +!4wini,t *win_ fractioni,t +!5 frac_ passi,t +!6wini,t
+!7win_ fractioni,t +"i,t+1 . 
Again,  t i pass frac , _  and  t i fraction win , _ , both measured between 0 and 1, are centered around 
their respective means.  In the context of this regression specification, our model predicts that  1 β
will be negative.  This means that the persistence of the offensive strategy for a strong team 
depends less on winning and losing than for a weak team.  Our model also predicts that  2 β  will 
be positive, indicating that stronger teams will exhibit a more persistent offensive strategy, 
regardless of wins or losses. 
  In Table 3, we see that these predictions hold both for the full sample as well as for 
games decided by six or fewer points.  Focusing on close games, we see that  1 β  is negative while 
2 β  is positive; both coefficients are statistically significant. 
To put the magnitudes into perspective, we predict the persistence of offensive strategy 
for winning and losing teams based on the fraction of games they won prior to the game.  Table 4 
shows these predicted persistence measures.  Note that because we demeaned fraction pass and 
the win fraction variables, the figures in the table do not simply reflect the simple sum of 
coefficients in Table 3.  We see that for teams that won all of their games in the first half of the 
season, the persistence of offensive strategy is roughly 0.3, regardless of whether the team wins   21 
or loses.  Conversely, teams which lost all games in the first half of the season have predicted 
persistence measures of about 0.3 if they win but the persistence is actually slightly negative 
when they lose.  Furthermore, because weak teams lose the majority of their games, the average 
persistence of offensive strategy for such teams will be much lower than for strong teams. 
 
Reacting to the Expected 
The third prediction of our model is that Bayesian coaches should update their strategy 
based only on performance which deviates from what was expected.  For instance, when teams 
unexpectedly lose to a weak team they should be more likely to update their strategy than when 
they lose to a strong team.  However, both expected and unexpected performance will influence 
whether the team ultimately wins or loses.  Consequently, coaches suffering from outcome bias 
will update their strategy both on the basis of expected and unexpected performance.  We 
quantify expected performance by looking at the gambling spread, which is empirically an 
unbiased estimate of the expected point differential.  Unexpected performance is the difference 
between the actual point differential and the gambling spread. 
More concretely, we estimate the following regression equation: 
frac_ passi,t+1 = !0 +!1frac_ passi,t *expected_perfi,t +!2 frac_ passi,t *unexpected_perfi,t
+!3frac_ passi,t +!4expected_perfi,t +!5unexpected_perfi,t +"i,t+1 , 
where expected_perfi,t  is the expected performance of team i in week t , and unexpected_perfi,t  
represents the unexpected performance. If coaches use standard Bayesian updating, then only  1 β  
should be positive and significant. With outcome bias, however, we might expect both  1 β  and 
2 β  to be positive and significant.  In Table 5, we find that expected and unexpected performance 
affect the persistence of the coach’s strategy in virtually identical ways.  This is particularly true   22 
for games decided by six or fewer points. This suggests that coaches don’t take into account the 
relative strength of their opponent when evaluating whether a strategy is likely to be effective 
going forward. 
 
The Relevance of Irrelevant Information 
Factors that are irrelevant to a team’s offensive strategy may also affect whether a team 
ultimately wins; our fourth prediction says a biased coach may allow such events to taint the 
evaluation of his offensive strategy.  For example, winning a football game depends both on how 
many points a team scores as well as the number of points scored by their opponent.  To the 
extent that the offensive strategy affects own points scored without affecting an opposing team’s 
ability to score, the coach should only look at offensive production when evaluating the efficacy 
of his offensive strategy. 
We test this prediction by estimating the following regression model: 
frac_ passi,t+1 = !0 +!1frac_ passi,t *own_pointsi,t +!2 frac_ passi,t *opp_pointsi,t
+!3frac_ passi,t +!4own_pointsi,t +!5opp_pointsi,t +"i,t+1 , 
where own_pointsi,t  is the points scored by the reference team and opp_pointsi,t  is the points 
scored by the opposing team. We would expect a Bayesian coach to update the fraction of 
passing plays based on offensive production; hence,  1 β  should be positive and significant.  
However, if coaches suffer from outcome bias, we would also expect  2 β  to be statistically 
significant, though negative.   
Table 6 shows the results from estimating this model. As expected, we find that if a team 
scored more points in the previous game, they will have more persistence in their offensive 
strategy. However, we also find that the number of points scored by the opposing team decreases   23 
the amount of persistence of the offensive strategy. In fact, when we look at just those situations 
where the previous game was decided by six or fewer points, we find that the effect of a team’s 
own score on persistence has nearly the same magnitude as the opponent’s score (with the 
opposite sign).  For these games, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the 
same in absolute value.  Taken literally, this would mean that a coach is as likely to revise his 
offensive strategy when his offense scores one less touchdown as when his defense allows one 
more touchdown. 
It is, of course, not the case that a team’s offensive strategy has no effect on the number 
of points scored by their opponent.  In particular, passing plays require less game time on 
average to execute.  Consequently, teams that pass more provide more opportunities for their 
opponent to score.  Teams that give up many points may want to pass less in subsequent games.  
This, however, does not affect our prediction about  1 β  and  2 β  but rather  5 β , which is the direct 
effect of opponent points on next week’s fraction pass.  This is born out in our empirical analysis. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  Decision makers have difficulty evaluating the efficacy of a strategy when random events 
also influence the final outcome.  One can easily misinterpret a favorable outcome as 
justification for a given strategy, overriding more subtle evidence to the contrary.  In this paper, 
we provide a theoretical definition of outcome bias, which distorts Bayesian updating by over-
weighting the ex-ante likelihood of the outcome that ex-post occurred.  This theory provides four 
clear predictions, all of which are borne out in our empirical application to strategy selection by 
NFL coaches.   24 
  In particular, coaches tend to change their strategy more frequently after losing a game 
compared to winning the game.  This occurs even when comparing narrow losses or victories, 
where winning has no predictive power about future success.  Teams that win frequently are 
much less sensitive to a single loss; but this higher persistence in strategy is also consistent with 
our theory of outcome bias.  In addition, coaches react equally to expected and unexpected 
performance.  Moreover, their offensive strategy is as likely to be revised whether responsibility 
for a loss lies with the offense or the defense. 
  It is not surprising that coaches would focus on the binary outcome of winning or losing a 
game; after all, this is what matters most to the team owners and fans, and will largely determine 
whether the coach retains his job.  But to maximize the chance of future wins, a coach ought to 
base his strategy revisions on information that most accurately predicts future success.  Outcome 
bias reduces the accuracy of his judgments, leading to complacency after narrow wins and 
excessive switching after narrow losses. 
  We chose to document outcome bias in this sports setting due to the ease of quantifying 
strategies, the availability of uniform data, and the high incentives for effective evaluation.  
However, we anticipate that decision makers in many other settings are equally susceptible to 
outcome bias.  For instance, sales personnel are often judged relative to sales goals.  A manager 
could easily place excessive weight on whether the salesperson cleared the mark, even when 
those just above the threshold may differ only in good fortune from those just below.  If so, the 
manager would make inefficient decisions in revamping sales incentives or retaining employees.  
Good programs or workers (with a modest amount of bad luck) would be scrapped, while those 
that barely cleared the threshold would be given too much credit for their success. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
  Mean  SD 
Fraction Pass  0.535  0.116 
Win  0.499  0.500 
Points Scored  20.72  10.24 
Score Differential  0  14.78 
      Abs(Score Differential)  11.59  9.17 
Expected Performance  0  6.65 
Unexpected Performance  0  13.25 
 
Notes: The sample includes all regular season games during the 1985-2009 NFL seasons and 
includes 10,578 team-game observations. The data comes from NFLData.com. 
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Table 2: The Impact of Winning on Persistence of Offensive Strategy 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Fraction Pass*Win  0.166**  0.107**  0.173**  0.163** 
[0.023]  [0.038]  [0.032]  [0.049] 
Fraction Pass  0.104**  0.145**  0.125**  0.145** 
[0.019]  [0.029]  [0.026]  [0.038] 
Win  -0.065**  -0.044**  0.030**  0.019** 
[0.013]  [0.021]  [0.004]  [0.005] 
Win Fraction*Fraction Pass      0.138*  0.291** 
    [0.080]  [0.135] 
Win Fraction      -0.047**  -0.039** 
      [0.008]  [0.012] 
         
Restrictions 
Full 
Sample 
Games 
within 6 
points 
Games after 
Week 8 
Games after 
Week 8/ 
within 6 
points 
Observations  10,573  3,972  5,330  2,033 
R-squared  0.029  0.031  0.045  0.050 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are cluster corrected at the team-year level. ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent level respectively. “Win” indicates 
whether the team won their previous game and “Win Fraction” is the fraction of current-season 
games prior to the current game that the team has won.     
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Table 3: The Impact of Winning on the Persistence of Offensive Strategy by Team Strength  
 
  (1)  (2) 
Win Fraction*Win* Fraction Pass  -0.218  -0.480* 
[0.158]  [0.250] 
Win Fraction *Fraction Pass  0.222*  0.440** 
[0.127]  [0.187] 
Win*Fraction Pass  0.177**  0.170** 
[0.033]  [0.049] 
Win Fraction *Win  -0.012  -0.063** 
[0.018]  [0.024] 
Fraction Pass  0.127**  0.144** 
  [0.026]  [0.039] 
Win  -0.031**  0.020** 
  [0.004]  [0.005] 
Win Fraction  -0.048**  -0.016 
  [0.012]  [0.016] 
     
Restrictions  Games after Week 8  Games after Week 8/ 
within 6 points 
Observations  5,330  2.033 
R-squared  0.045  0.055 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are cluster corrected at the team-year level. ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent level respectively. “Win” indicates 
whether the team won their previous game and “Win Fraction” is the fraction of current-season 
games prior to the current game that the team has won.     
     
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Predicted Persistence for Winners and Losers by Team Strength 
 
  Won Current Game  Lost Current Game 
Win Fraction=1  0.293  0.364 
Win Fraction=0  0.334  -0.076   30 
Table 5: The Impact of Expected and Unexpected Performance on Persistence of Offensive 
Strategy  
 
  (1)  (2) 
Expected Performance * Fraction Pass  0.004**  0.016** 
[0.002]  [0.006] 
Unexpected Performance * Fraction Pass  0.005**  0.013** 
[0.001]  [0.005] 
Fraction Pass  0.201**  0.208** 
[0.033]  [0.021] 
Expected Performance  -0.002**  -0.006** 
[0.001]  [0.003] 
Unexpected Performance  -0.002**  -0.004** 
  [0.000]  [0.003] 
P-values 
Ho: Expected Performance Interaction=Unexpected 
Performance Interaction 
   
0.550  0.354 
Restrictions  Full Sample  Games within 6 points 
Observations  10,573  3,972 
R-squared  0.032  0.033 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are cluster corrected at the team-year level. ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent level respectively.   
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Table 6: The Impact of Own and Opponent Scoring on Persistence of Offensive Strategy  
 
  (1)  (2) 
Own Score * Fraction Pass  0.007**  0.014** 
[0.001]  [0.005] 
Opponent Score * Fraction Passed  -0.003**  -0.013** 
[0.001]  [0.005] 
Fraction Passed  0.117**  0.186** 
[0.032]  [0.056] 
Own Score  0.001**  0.002** 
[0.000]  [0.001] 
Opponent Score  -0.001*  -0.002** 
  [0.000]  [0.001] 
P-values 
Ho:  Own Score Interaction + Opponent Score 
Interaction =0 
   
0.007  0.699 
Restrictions  Full Sample  Games within 6 points 
Observations  10,573  3,972 
R-squared  0.032  0.033 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets and are cluster corrected at the team-year level. ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent level respectively.     
     
     32 
 
Notes: Each point in the figure represents a separate estimate.  The X-axis indicates the 
maximum absolute score difference that is allowed for the observation to be included in the 
estimate, e.g. a value of 5 indicates that the previous game was decided by 5 or fewer points. 
Figure 1a provides the difference in the probability of winning the next game between the team 
that won and the team that lost. Figure 1b provides the estimated persistence effect; that is, the 
effect that winning has on whether a team continues using a particular offensive strategy. The 
dotted lines provide the 95% confidence interval for each estimate.   
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 Figure 1a: Difference in Probability of Winning Next Game
 Winners Minus Losers
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 Figure 1b: Effect of Winning on Persistence  33 
 
Notes: These figures are the same as those in Figure 1a and 1b except we only use games from 
the second half of the season and control for the team’s winning percentage in the first half of the 
season. In Figure 2b, we also control for the interaction of the winning percentage and fraction 
pass.  Because both variables are centered about their means, this does not affect the 
interpretation of the coefficient.  
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 Figure 2a: Difference in Probability of Winning Next Game
 Winners Minus Losers-Controlling for Team Strength
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 Figure 2b: Effect of Winning on Persistence-Controlling
 for Team Strength